Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., Native API).
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective.
The Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths. This functionality resides in dlfcn.h
in functions such as dlopen
and dlsym
. Although macOS can execute .so
files, common practice uses .dylib
files.[1][2][3][4]
The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll
and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like LoadLibrary
at run time.[5]
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0373 | Astaroth |
Astaroth uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules. [6] |
S0438 | Attor |
Attor's dispatcher can execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs.[7] |
S0520 | BLINDINGCAN |
BLINDINGCAN has loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime on a victim machine.[8] |
S0415 | BOOSTWRITE |
BOOSTWRITE has used the DWriteCreateFactory() function to load additional modules.[9] |
S1039 | Bumblebee |
Bumblebee can use |
S0673 | DarkWatchman |
DarkWatchman can load DLLs.[11] |
S0567 | Dtrack |
Dtrack contains a function that calls |
S0661 | FoggyWeb |
FoggyWeb's loader can call the |
S0032 | gh0st RAT | |
S0203 | Hydraq |
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can load and call DLL functions.[15][16] |
S0607 | KillDisk | |
S0455 | Metamorfo |
Metamorfo had used AutoIt to load and execute the DLL payload.[18] |
S0352 | OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D |
For network communications, OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D loads a dynamic library ( |
S0501 | PipeMon |
PipeMon has used call to |
S0196 | PUNCHBUGGY |
PUNCHBUGGY can load a DLL using the LoadLibrary API.[20] |
S1078 | RotaJakiro |
RotaJakiro uses dynamically linked shared libraries ( |
S0603 | Stuxnet |
Stuxnet calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.[21] |
S0467 | TajMahal |
TajMahal has the ability to inject the |
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M1038 | Execution Prevention |
Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through this technique by using application control tools capable of preventing unknown modules from being loaded. |
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
---|---|---|---|
DS0011 | Module | Module Load |
Monitoring module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of shared modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled, or system modules such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious Limiting module loads to trusted directories, such as |
DS0009 | Process | OS API Execution |
Monitor for API calls that may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. |